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INTRODUCTION
Today, trademarks infiltrate every aspect of our lives;
companies spend huge sums of money developing and maintaining
their trademarks.1 Every day we look for particular trademarks to
tell us what coffee to drink, what clothes to buy, and what food to
eat without giving thought to the trademarks’ origins. However,
trademarks as we know them today are the product of millennia of
evolution. The first trademarks, used over seven thousand years
ago, were merely simple markings placed on pottery and animals
As the marketplace became more
to signify ownership.2
sophisticated, trademarks did too. Word and image marks, which
we take for granted today, first appeared in the Roman Empire.3 In
the Middle Ages, the burgeoning use of trademarks in the
marketplace finally led to the development of legislative regulation
of trademarks.4 Trademark regulation was soon followed by the
first instances of litigation over ownership and infringement of
trademarks,5 heralding the beginning of trademark law as we know
it today.
Trademark law has continued evolving to meet the changing
needs of society and the marketplace. Even over the past hundred
years, trademark law has experienced a dramatic transformation
with the advent of trademark dilution law.6 Trademark dilution is
distinct from traditional trademark infringement because it is not
predicated on a likelihood of consumer confusion.7 Instead,
dilution protects the power of trademarks to create and maintain

1
Cf. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(recognizing that companies spend millions of dollars on developing their trademarks).
2
FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS & TRADEMARKS 19
(2d ed. 1993).
3
Id. at 20.
4
Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks—Their Early History: Part I, 69 TRADEMARK REP.
551, 555 (1969).
5
FOSTER & SHOOK, supra note 2, at 21.
6
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 537 U.S. 418, 429–31 (2003).
7
See id. at 429.
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associations in consumers’ minds.8 Dilution comes in two types,
blurring and tarnishment. Blurring protects the associative power
of a trademark from being weakened or blurred, and tarnishment
protects the associative power of a trademark from being tainted by
negative associations.9
Although dilution started out as a “creature of state law,”10
Congress later passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(“FTDA”) adding dilution to the Lanham Act.11 The FTDA
provided dilution protection to a limited group of highly famous
and distinctive marks.12 However, as with any development, the
FTDA experienced growing pains. These growing pains took the
form of unfavorable and often inconsistent judicial
interpretations.13
In the meantime, under the FTDA, federal courts almost
unanimously required the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s
mark and plaintiff’s mark met a mark similarity standard before a
claim for dilution could proceed.14 Despite this unanimity, each
circuit employed its own mark similarity standard, ranging from
requirements that marks be “identical or near identical” to
“substantially or very similar.”15
Then, in response to the hostile and inconsistent judicial
interpretations, Congress ushered in the next era of federal dilution
law by enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
(“TDRA”).16 The TDRA represented an ambitious and extensive
overhaul of federal dilution law.17 And, in its wake, courts have
grappled with whether pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should
continue to be applicable under the TDRA.18 On the one hand, the
owners of famous marks, backed by the International Trademark
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See infra notes 28–37, 41–44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002).
Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (amended 2006).
See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 52–68, 71–84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.
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Association, convinced some courts to discard pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards.19 On the other hand, small businesses, backed
by prominent trademark scholars, have argued against abandoning
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.20 Is disposing of pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards the next evolutionary step in federal
dilution law? Or is this recent development an aberrant mutation?
This question is further complicated because courts that have
discarded pre-TDRA mark similarity standards have reached
different conclusions regarding the role of mark similarity in their
absence.21 The Second Circuit, for example, refuses to allow mark
similarity to be judged by any standard and refuses to allow mark
similarity to be dispositive.22 The Ninth Circuit also refuses to
allow mark similarity to be judged by any standard but, unlike the
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit allows an abundance of mark
similarity to be dispositive.23 The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, using a vastly different approach, judges mark similarity by
a new, lower mark similarity standard and allows a lack of mark
similarity to be dispositive.24 Accordingly, in addition to the
uncertainty regarding whether pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards apply to the TDRA, it is also unclear what role mark
similarity should have if pre-TDRA mark similarity standards do
not apply.
In deciding these two issues, courts are faced with the difficult
task of adhering to the language of the TDRA and allowing valid
claims of dilution by blurring to proceed, while being pressured to
maintain the balance between free and fair competition inherent in
trademark law.
This Note will begin, in Part I, by highlighting the important
formative events in the development of dilution law leading to the
current state of the law. Part I will then briefly discuss some of the
policy concerns implicated by dilution and unfair competition law.
In Part II, this Note will describe the split in opinion over whether
19
20
21
22
23
24

See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.1.a.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
See infra Part II.B.2.
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pre-TDRA mark similarity standards survived the passage of the
TDRA. Part II will also highlight the divergent interpretations of
the role of mark similarity in the absence of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards. In Part III, this Note will ultimately argue
that courts should abandon pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
In their stead, this Note contends that mark similarity should be
judged by the new, lower mark similarity standard enunciated by
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DILUTION: FROM THE RATIONAL BASIS TO
THE TRADEMARK DILUTION REVISION ACT
A. The Dawn of Dilution
Trademark law protects any word, name, symbol, or device
used to identify and distinguish goods or services from those of
another manufacturer or service provider.25 Traditionally, a
trademark has been protected from uses of a junior mark26 on
competing goods that were likely to cause consumer confusion
regarding the source of the goods or services. However, over the
last century, trademark protection has expanded to include
protection of certain marks against a junior mark on different
grounds.27
This protection, which has come to be labeled “dilution,” was
initially described and advocated for by Frank Schechter in his
seminal 1927 law review article.28 In the article, Schechter defined
25
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The items protected by trademark law will be referred to
collectively as “trademarks” or “marks” for the purposes of this Note.
26
For purposes of this Note, “junior mark” refers to the subsequent use of an
established or senior mark. A junior user is a subsequent user of a senior mark. See, e.g.,
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989) ("The
first to use a mark on a product or service in a particular geographic market, the senior
user, acquires rights in the mark in that market. Junior users [are those] who
subsequently use the same or similar mark on similar products or services . . . ." (citation
omitted)).
27
2-5A ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5A.03 (2011) (discussing
the history of dilution statutes and the scope of trademark protection with respect to
dilution).
28
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927).
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dilution as, “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its
use upon non-competing goods.”29 In formulating this definition,
Schechter observed cases, such as Wall v. Rolls-Royce,30 in which
strict application of traditional trademark law would not have
provided trademark owners with a remedy because the junior mark
was being used on non-competing goods.31 However, the court
allowed these trademark owners to recover under traditional
trademark law despite its inapplicability.32
Schechter posited that courts were protecting the value of a
trademark, which he claimed derived from its selling power.33
Selling power, according to Schechter, depended not only on the
quality of the goods in question, but also on the power of a
trademark to create and maintain associations in the minds of
consumers.34 Schechter posited that this power was derived from
the uniqueness or distinctiveness of the trademark.35 Schechter
believed traditional trademark infringement did not adequately
protect this alternative—but highly valuable—aspect of
trademarks.36 Consequently, Schechter asserted that protecting
trademarks from dilution was a necessary development in the law
of trademarks and unfair competition.37
Although courts continued to hand down decisions that could
only be rationalized by Schechter’s article,38 twenty years passed
before dilution was formally recognized as a ground for trademark
protection by a Massachusetts statute.39 The Massachusetts
enactment marked the beginning of statutory recognition of

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 825.
4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925).
Schechter, supra note 28, at 821–22.
See id. at 820–21.
See id. at 831.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 830–31.
See, e.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.).
See 1947 Mass. Acts, p. 300, ch. 307.
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dilution, and at least twenty-five states have enacted statutes that
protect against trademark dilution.40
In addition, as dilution has evolved, it has expanded beyond
Schechter’s initial definition into two distinct species of dilution:
“dilution by tarnishment” and “dilution by blurring.” Dilution by
blurring, which is the focus of this Note, is defined by many as
“the whittling away” of a mark’s selling power through use of
similar, unauthorized marks.41 Common examples of dilution by
blurring are “Kodak Pianos” and “Buick Aspirin.”42 Dilution by
tarnishment provides a different type of protection and is generally
defined as an association between a junior and senior mark that
portrays the senior mark in a negative context.43 A famous
example of dilution by tarnishment is a magazine’s portrayal of the
Pillsbury Dough Boy in a pornographic manner.44
B. Dilution Climbs from the State Law Ooze: The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act
For many years, dilution protection varied on a state-by-state
basis.45 Many saw this patchwork protection as inadequate due to
the lack of standardization and the reluctance of courts to grant
nationwide injunctions under state law.46 Then, in 1995, these
concerns compelled Congress to pass the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”).47 The FTDA defined dilution as
the “lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services.”48 The FTDA also made clear that,
unlike traditional trademark infringement, protection against
dilution was available regardless of whether the marks were used

40

Ringling-Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).
41
See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
42
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
43
See, e.g., Deer & Co., 41 F.3d at 43.
44
See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
45
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3–4.
46
See id.
47
See id.
48
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (amended 2006).
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on competing products or whether the junior mark created a
likelihood of consumer confusion.49
The FTDA also provided:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled,
subject to the principles of equity and upon such
terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person’s commercial use
in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided
in this subsection.50
This language was interpreted to require a plaintiff to establish
the following five elements in order to receive injunctive relief: (1)
the senior mark must be famous; (2) the senior mark must be
distinctive; (3) the junior mark must be used commercially; (4) the
junior mark must have begun to be used after the senior mark
became famous; and (5) the junior mark’s use must “cause dilution
of the distinctive quality of the senior mark.”51
Although the FTDA provided a list of factors for courts to use
when determining whether marks were “famous,” no other
guidance was provided to aid courts in determining whether the
elements were met.52 This led to substantial disagreement over the
interpretation and application of these elements. For example, the
FTDA simply required distinctiveness and did not explicitly
indicate whether inherent or acquired distinctiveness could satisfy
the distinctiveness requirement.53 Consequently, some courts
limited dilution protection to inherently distinctive marks,54 while
other courts allowed marks that had inherent or acquired
49

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
51
See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (Leval,
J.). Alternatively, some courts only employed four factors by considering the fame and
distinctiveness elements as one element. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
52
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
53
See id. § 1125(c)(1).
54
See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Comms., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
50
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distinctiveness to qualify for dilution protection.55 Despite the
guidance on how to determine whether fame existed, the fame
element was also the subject of disagreement because the FTDA
did not explicitly define what constituted sufficient fame to justify
dilution protection.56 Accordingly, some courts allowed the fame
element to be satisfied by proof of fame in a specialized or niche
market,57 while other courts rejected the niche market theory and
required proof of fame among the general public.58
The fifth element, which required that the junior mark “cause
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark,” was similarly
subject to inconsistent interpretations. For one, although all courts
agreed that this language allowed for claims of dilution by
blurring, courts questioned whether this language allowed for
claims of dilution by tarnishment.59 Courts also disagreed over
whether the “cause dilution” element required proof of “actual
dilution” or “a likelihood of dilution.” On the one hand, the Fourth
and Fifth Circuit interpreted “cause dilution” to require proof of
“actual dilution.”60 In these circuits, plaintiffs were required to
show proof that they had suffered actual harm. On the other hand,
the First, Second, Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits interpreted
“cause dilution” to require proof of a “likelihood of dilution.”61 In
these circuits, the possibility of harm was sufficient to support a
claim of dilution.

55

See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, LLC, 212 F.3d
157, 163 (3d Cir. 2000).
56
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
57
See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 164; Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek
Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise
Rent-A-Car, 238 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001).
58
See, e.g., TCPIP Holding, 244 F.3d at 99.
59
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 452 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999).
60
See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670–71 (5th Cir.
2000); Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d 449 at 461.
61
See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 474–76 (6th Cir. 2001),
rev’d, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466–
68 (7th Cir. 2000); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d 157, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2000);
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 220, 224–25 (2d Cir. 1999); I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47–50 (1st Cir. 1998).
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The FTDA also failed to provide courts with any guidance on
how to prove whether a junior mark “caused dilution.”62 For this
reason, some courts relied on their prior experience crafting the
likelihood of confusion standard to create non-exhaustive lists of
relevant factors for courts to consider when making this
determination.63 The Second Circuit, the champion of this
approach, developed a list of ten relevant factors.64
Although some circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s list of
factors,65 other circuits later criticized the Second Circuit’s list for
including irrelevant factors and adopted different lists of factors.66
In particular, the Seventh Circuit significantly truncated the
Second Circuit’s list of factors.67 In fact, the Seventh Circuit only
considered two factors—the fame of the senior mark and the
similarity between the marks—when determining whether dilution
existed.68
Despite disagreement over which factors were relevant and
whether to use factors at all, similarity between marks was part of
the dilution analysis in every circuit.69 And, in most circuits, the
marks at issue were required to reach a minimum standard before a

62

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (amended 2006).
See, e.g., Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216–17.
64
Id. at 217–223. The Second Circuit determined that the following ten factors were
relevant:
(a) Distinctiveness.
(b) Similarity of the marks.
(c) Proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap.
(d) Interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the
similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products.
(e) Shared consumers and geographic limitations.
(f) Sophistication of consumers.
(g) Actual confusion.
(h) Adjectival or referential quality of the junior use.
(i) Harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user.
(j) Effect of the senior’s prior laxity in protecting the mark.
Id.
65
See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 168–69.
66
See, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 803–05 (6th Cir. 2004).
67
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2000).
68
See id. at 469.
69
2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(5)(c)(i) (2011).
63
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claim for dilution could proceed.70 For the purposes of this Note,
these standards are referred to as mark similarity standards.
Courts formulated their mark similarity standards in
substantially different ways. In particular, the Fourth Circuit
required “sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks
to invoke an ‘instinctive mental association’ of the two [marks] by
a relevant universe of consumers.”71 The Second Circuit seemed
to adopt the Fourth Circuit’s standard when it required “sufficient
similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will
conjure an association with the senior.”72 However, the Second
Circuit’s mark similarity standard was repeatedly restated as
requiring marks to be “very” or “substantially” similar.73
The First and Eighth Circuits required marks to be “similar
enough that a significant segment of . . . customers sees the two
marks as essentially the same.”74 The Ninth Circuit, following the
Eighth Circuit, required marks to be “identical or nearly
identical.”75 Additionally, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
seemingly conflating the above standards, required marks to be
“identical or ‘very or substantially similar.’”76 The Board
continued by holding the mark similarity standard for dilution was
the Eighth Circuit’s standard: whether consumers would see the
two marks as “essentially the same.”77
In addition to formulating their mark similarity standards
differently, courts justified their mark similarity standards in
different ways. Some courts applied mark similarity standards as

70

See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
72
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999).
73
See, e.g., Playtex Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 390 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2004)
(Sotomayor, J.) (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 176 (2d
Cir. 2000)) (restating “sufficient similarity” as “very or substantially similar”).
74
Luigino’s Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999); see also I.P.
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 1998).
75
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Luigino’s
Inc., 170 F.3d at 832).
76
Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1183 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
77
Id.
71
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part of their dilution analysis.78 These courts generally relied on
dilution theory and prior interpretations of state dilution law.79 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit justified its mark similarity
standard by looking at the language, legislative history, and
purpose of the FTDA.80
Recognizing the disagreement among many of the circuit
courts, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court attempted to settle one of the conflicts discussed
above.81 In particular, the Court decided to resolve the conflict
over whether the “causes dilution” language in the FTDA required
proof of “actual dilution” or “likelihood of dilution” in order to
bring some clarity to the FTDA.82 The Court determined the
“cause dilution” language required proof of “actual dilution.”83
Along the way, the Court questioned whether dilution could occur
when the marks at issue were not identical, seemingly providing
support for the mark similarity standards discussed above.84
However, the Court’s decision was not long-lived.85
C. Bringing Dilution Back from the Brink: The Trademark
Dilution Revision Act
According to some, the Court’s “actual dilution” requirement
in Moseley effectively eradicated federal dilution law as an
effective tool.86 In their opinion, the “actual dilution” requirement
meant prospective plaintiffs would have to wait until dilution had
already significantly and irreparably harmed the famous mark.87
Congress was persuaded by this reasoning and quickly overruled
the Court’s holding in Moseley through the Trademark Dilution
78

See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., id.
80
See Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
81
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
82
Id. at 421–22.
83
Id. at 433.
84
See id. at 432.
85
See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
86
See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President,
International Trademark Association).
87
Id.
79
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Revision Act of 2006.88 In the TDRA, Congress clarified that
federal dilution law only requires proof of “likelihood of
dilution.”89
Although the TDRA still requires proof of five elements,
Congress substantially altered these elements to clarify dilution
law and settle many of the circuit splits that emerged under the
FTDA.90 Under the TDRA, a plaintiff bringing a dilution claim
needs to prove: (1) its mark is famous among the general
consuming public; (2) its mark is distinctive, inherently or through
acquired distinctiveness; (3) the junior mark began to be used after
the famous mark became famous; (4) the junior mark is being used
in commerce; (5) the junior mark is likely to cause dilution of the
famous mark.91
In addition to clarifying that “actual dilution” is not required,
these new elements make clear that niche fame is insufficient to
support a claim for dilution.92 It also provides that marks with
acquired distinctiveness can qualify for dilution protection, and
that federal dilution law protects against both blurring and
tarnishment.93 Moreover, in an effort to better assist courts in
determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous, the TDRA
amended the list of factors contained in the FTDA for courts to
consider when analyzing whether a mark is sufficiently famous.94
The TDRA also provides guidance to courts applying the fifth
element by explicitly defining dilution by blurring and providing a
list of factors courts can consider when determining whether this
definition has been met.95 Specifically, the TDRA defines dilution
by blurring as an “association arising from the similarity between a
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the

88

Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
90
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
91
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
92
See Barton Beebe, Symposium: A Defense of the New Federal Trademark
Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1157–58 (2006).
93
See id. at 1159–61, 1172–74.
94
See id. at 1158–59.
95
See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B).
89
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distinctiveness of the famous mark.”96 And, the non-exhaustive
list of factors a court can consider to determine whether there is a
likelihood of dilution by blurring is as follows:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or
trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of
the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous
mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or
trade name and the famous mark.97
D. Is Dilution an Invasive Species? Concerns About Dilution’s
Justification and Anti-Competitive Effects
During the course of dilution’s evolution, courts and scholars
have remained skeptical of dilution protection. In particular,
courts and commentators have characterized dilution as a “limited
remedy” and have warned about the dangers of expansive dilution
protection.98 At its core, this skepticism can be traced to concerns
about the policy groundings of federal dilution law.99 For instance,
traditional trademark protection focuses on protecting consumers
and protecting trademark owners from unfair practices.100 In

96
See id. The TDRA also defines dilution by tarnishment as an “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the
reputation of the famous mark.” See id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
97
Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi).
98
See, e.g., 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(1).
99
See, e.g., Paul Alan Levy, Symposium: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—A
Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189, 1192–94
(2006).
100
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (citing Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)).
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contrast, dilution protection is not justified by protecting
consumers.101
However, although some scholars tout consumer protection as
the sole function of trademark law,102 trademark law is also aimed
at protecting the trademark owner and prohibiting unfair
competition.103 In fact, trademark law is doctrinally located within
the broader law of unfair competition.104 Unfair competition is
premised on the balancing of free competition and fair
competition.105 The doctrine of free competition logically provides
businesses with a right to attract customers from other
businesses.106 On the other hand, fair competition recognizes there
are certain business practices a business could use to attract
customers which, nevertheless, should be prohibited for the benefit
of the public and for the sake of fairness.107
Regardless, courts and scholars remain worried about the
dangers of expansive dilution.108 According to some scholars and
courts, expansive dilution protection is tantamount to granting
rights “in gross” to trademark owners.109 A trademark right “in
gross” is defined as a right that does not grow out of the
commercial use of the trademark.110 Trademark law is generally
regarded as having a presumption against granting trademark rights
“in gross” in part because they impair free competition.111 This
presumption has been used to justify limiting dilution protection.112

101

Id. at 429.
See, e.g., Levy, supra note 99, at 1192–93.
103
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428 (citing Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64).
104
See id.
105
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.
106
See id. § 25 cmt. a.
107
See id. § 25 cmt. g.
108
See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 1999).
109
See, e.g., id. at 875 (citing 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
& UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:108 (Supp. 1998)).
110
See United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
111
See id.
112
See, e.g., Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875.
102
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II. EVOLVING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS: ARE PRE-TDRA MARK
SIMILARITY STANDARDS STILL APPLICABLE UNDER THE TDRA
AND, IF NOT, WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE OF MARK SIMILARITY?
Prior to the enactment of the TDRA, courts required famous
marks to meet high mark similarity standards before a claim for
dilution by burring could proceed.113 However, after enactment of
the TDRA, the owners of famous marks and the International
Trademark Association persuaded the Second and Ninth Circuits to
discard their pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.114 While no
other circuit court has addressed the issue, some district courts
have determined that pre-TDRA mark similarity standards are still
applicable.115 Additionally, small businesses and prominent
trademark scholars argue for the continued use of pre-TDRA mark
Accordingly, there is significant
similarity standards.116
uncertainty regarding whether courts should continue to use preTDRA mark similarity standards as part of the dilution by blurring
analysis.
Adding to the uncertainty, in the absence of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards, courts have reached inconsistent results
regarding the role of mark similarity in the dilution by blurring
analysis. On the one hand, the Second and Ninth Circuits employ
mildly different approaches that minimize the role of mark
similarity.117 On the other hand, the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board employs a vastly different approach to the role of mark
113

See supra notes 69–77and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.1.a–b.
115
See 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27 § 5A.01(5)(c)(i) (2011) (noting no other circuit
courts have addressed this issue); see also Council on American-Islamic Rels. Action
Network, Inc. v. Schlussel, No. 11-10061, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89199, at *16–17
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2011) (applying pre-TDRA mark similarity standard); V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 744–45 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (applying preTDRA mark similarity standard). Other lower courts have interpreted the TDRA
consistently with the Second and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v.
Teachbook.Com LLC, 819 F. Supp. 2d 764, 780–81 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (questioning the
continued use of mark similarity standards); Cottonwood Fin. Ltd. v. Cash Stores Fin.
Servs., 778 F. Supp. 2d 726, 750 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (interpreting Texas dilution law,
which is the same as federal dilution law, to abandon the use of mark similarity
standards).
116
See infra Part II.A.2.
117
See infra Part II.B.1.
114
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similarity that gives mark similarity a central role in the blurring
analysis.118 Consequently, not only is the applicability of preTDRA mark similarity standards in question, but, more generally,
the proper role of mark similarity is also unsettled.
This section details the preceding conflict regarding pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards and the proper role of mark similarity. It
first presents the reasons given by the Second and Ninth Circuits
for abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards and then
discusses other arguments made by owners of famous marks and
the International Trademark Association advocating for
abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. Next, it sets
forth the arguments made by small businesses and prominent
trademark scholars supporting continuing to use pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards in the dilution by blurring analysis.
Subsequently, this section analyzes the inconsistent treatment
of mark similarity among courts that have abandoned pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards. It begins by outlining the approach of
the Second and Ninth Circuits, which, while similar, have
substantial differences. It concludes by exploring the vastly
different approach used by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
A. Are Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Appropriately
Employed After the Revisions Made by the TDRA?
In the wake of the revisions made by the TDRA, courts and
commentators have disagreed over the continued applicability of
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. On the one hand, the Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the International Trademark
Association support discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards. On the other hand, prominent trademark scholars and
small businesses support continuing to apply pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards. This section details the arguments made by
these groups in turn.

118

See infra Part II.B.2.
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1. The Case for Discarding Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity
Standards
There are a variety of arguments for discarding pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards in light of the revisions made by the
TDRA. Some of these arguments have been articulated and
adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits when these circuits
discarded their respective pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
Still the International Trademark Association has made other
arguments in favor of discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards.
a) The Second Circuit’s Reasons for Discarding PreTDRA Mark Similarity Standards
In Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., the Second
Circuit surprisingly held that its pre-TDRA mark similarity
standard requiring marks to be “very” or “substantially similar”
should not be employed under the TDRA.119 In Starbucks Corp.,
Starbucks, a ubiquitous company known for coffee products,
brought suit in the Southern District of New York against Black
Bear, a small company also in the business of selling coffee
products, for using CHARBUCKS BLEND and MISTER
CHARBUCKS.120 Starbucks alleged Black Bear’s use of these
marks constituted trademark dilution of the “Starbucks Marks”
under the FTDA 121 After a two-day bench trial, the district court
dismissed Starbucks’ dilution claim under the FTDA because
Starbucks had not proven actual dilution.122
Starbucks appealed, but before the appeal was heard Congress
passed the TDRA, which replaced the “actual dilution”
requirement with a “likelihood of dilution” requirement.123
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.124 Again, the district court ruled in favor of Black
119

588 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that the District Court erred to the
extent it required ‘substantial’ similarity between the marks. . . .”).
120
See id. at 103.
121
See id. at 102–03.
122
See id. at 104.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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Bear.125 In its analysis, the district court applied the Second
Circuit’s pre-TDRA mark similarity standard and determined the
marks were not “substantially” similar.126 As a result, the district
court found “[t]his dissimilarity alone is sufficient to defeat
[Starbucks’] blurring claim, and in any event, this factor at a
minimum weighs strongly against [Starbucks] in the dilution
analysis.”127 On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded the district
court had improperly required the marks to be “substantially
similar” as part of its dilution by blurring analysis.128
Before turning to the language of the TDRA, the Second
Circuit analyzed its reasons, or lack thereof, for adopting its
“substantial similarity” standard under the FTDA.129 The court
found it had not based its pre-TDRA mark similarity on the FTDA,
which did not provide courts with a definition of dilution and, also,
did not provide courts with guidance on how to weigh similarity
when analyzing dilution.130 Instead, the Second Circuit reasoned
its “substantial similarity” standard was attributable to reliance on
prior interpretations of state dilution statutes because the state
statutes were better defined.131 For this reason, the Second Circuit
found its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard not properly justified
under the FTDA.132
Then, turning to the language of the TDRA, the Second Circuit
noted the language of the TDRA compelled abandonment of its
“substantial similarity” standard.133 In particular, the Second
Circuit focused on the following statutory language134:
“dilution by blurring” is association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
125

Id. at 104–05.
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
127
Id.
128
Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109.
129
See id. at 107–08.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 108.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
See id.
126
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famous mark. In determining whether a mark or
trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring,
the court may consider all relevant factors,
including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or
trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of
the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous
mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or
trade name and the famous mark.135
According to the Second Circuit, the absence of the terms
“very” or “substantial” from this statutory language meant the
“substantially similar” standard should be abandoned.136
Moreover, the Second Circuit noted the TDRA specifically
instructs courts to weigh the “degree of similarity.”137 The Second
Circuit stated this mandate was inconsistent with requiring
“substantial” similarity to support a successful dilution claim.138
The Second Circuit further supported its position by pointing
out that employing pre-TDRA mark similarity standards would
improperly minimize the importance of the other factors.139 To
enumerate, “degree of similarity” is one of six non-exhaustive
factors.140 And, according to the court, embracing the “substantial
similarity” standard would marginalize the other five factors unless

135
136
137
138
139
140

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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there were substantial similarity.141 The court found this to be
improper because it violated a bedrock principle of statutory
interpretation, that every piece of a statute should have meaning.142
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the statutory text provided
strong evidence that courts should not employ the “substantial
similarity” standard.143
b) The Ninth Circuit’s Reasons for Discarding its PreTDRA Mark Similarity Standard
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., the
Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s lead when it held its
pre-TDRA mark similarity standard, which required marks to be
“identical” or “nearly identical,” should no longer be employed.144
In Levi Strauss & Co., Levi Strauss, a clothing manufacturer and
retailer, sued Abercrombie, another clothing manufacturer and
retailer, for trademark dilution in violation of the TDRA.145 The
marks at issue in this case were patterns located on the back pocket
of each company’s blue jeans.146 Levi Strauss’s mark, named
“Arcuate” consisted of “two connecting arches that meet in the
center of the [back] pocket.”147 Abercrombie’s mark, named
“Ruehl . . . consist[ed] of two less-pronounced arches that are
connected by a ‘dipsy doodle,’ which resembles the mathematical
sign for infinity.”148
During a bench trial with advisory rulings from the jury, the
jury was asked: “Is Abercrombie’s Ruehl design identical or nearly
identical to the Arcuate trademark?”149 The advisory jury
responded that the marks were not identical or nearly identical.150

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Kozeny, 541 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 2008)).
See id. at 109.
633 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. See infra Figure A.
Id. See infra Figure B.
Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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The advisory jury also found Abercrombie’s design was not likely
to dilute Levi Strauss’s mark.151
After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Abercrombie on
Levi Strauss’s federal dilution claim.152 The district court noted
that Levi Strauss did not prove Abercrombie was “making
commercial use of a mark that is identical or nearly identical to the
Arcuate mark.”153 The district court also found that, since the
marks were not identical or nearly identical and Levi Strauss did
not produce “persuasive evidence of actual association,” both the
similarity and actual association factors weighed in favor of
Abercrombie.154 In addition, the district court reasoned, “even if
the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the Arcuate
mark and the degree of recognition of the mark weigh in [Levi
Strauss]’s favor, the Court finds that those factors do not outweigh
the factors that weigh in [Abercrombie]’s favor.”155 Consequently,
the district court agreed with the advisory jury’s determination that
Abercrombie’s “Ruehl” mark was not likely to cause dilution by
blurring of Levi Strauss’s “Arcuate” mark.156 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held requiring marks to be “identical, nearly identical or
substantially similar” was improper.157
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion, like the Second Circuit,
by tracing the origin of its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard.158
The Ninth Circuit traced the support for its initial adoption of the
“identical or nearly identical” standard to a case interpreting the
New York dilution statute.159 The Ninth Circuit also found it had
later determined the “identical or nearly identical” standard was
supported by the language, legislative history, and purpose of the

151

Id.
Id.
153
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., No. C 07-03752 (JSW),
2009 WL 1082175, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (emphasis added).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1172.
158
See id. at 1162–65.
159
See id. at 1163–64 (“[T]he requirement of identity, or substantial similarity, predates the adoption of the FTDA in 1996, and has its origins in state dilution law,
specifically that of the State of New York.”).
152

C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 4:49 PM

EVOLUTION OR MUTATION?

315

FTDA in Thane International, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp.160
Particularly, Thane focused on the language in the FTDA stating a
junior user “must use ‘a mark or trade name . . . after the mark has
become famous.’”161
This language, according to Thane,
necessitated use of “essentially the same mark, not just a similar
one” to satisfy a federal dilution claim.162 Thane found this
reasoning was supported because the only examples of dilution
from the legislative history involved use of the identical mark.163
Thane also supported its reading of the FTDA’s text by describing
dilution as a form of appropriation that “implied [dilution requires]
the adoption of the mark itself.”164 Therefore, unlike the Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit justified its pre-TDRA mark similarity
standard in the text of the FTDA.
Regardless, reaching the issue before the court, the Ninth
Circuit held that the “identical” or “nearly identical” standard was
no longer applicable under the TDRA.165 The Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning was similar to the Second Circuit’s reasoning. However,
the Ninth Circuit also reasoned that its holding was supported by
Congress’s extensive overhaul of the FTDA.166 According to the
court, this extensive overhaul showed Congress did not intend to
be bound by prior interpretations of the FTDA, including the
interpretations that led to the use of pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards.167
c) Other Arguments for Discarding Pre-TDRA Mark
Similarity Standards
The owners of famous trademarks and the International
Trademark Association have advanced other arguments for
discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. One argument is
that pre-TDRA mark similarity standards lacked justification and,
160

Id. at 1164 (discussing Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
161
Id. at 1164 (quoting Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 905).
162
Id. (quoting Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 905) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163
See id. at 1164–65 (citing Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 906).
164
See id. at 1165 (quoting Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 906).
165
Id. at 1172.
166
See id.
167
See id.
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as a result, should not continue to be employed.168 The Second
Circuit admitted its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard was
improperly justified because it relied solely on interpretation of a
state law.169 Most pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were
justified in the same way the Second Circuit justified its
standard.170 Accordingly, pre-TDRA standards are criticized
because they relied on interpretation of a state dilution statute with
no justification for extending the rule to federal dilution law.171
Although neither the Second nor the Ninth Circuit considered
the legislative history of the TDRA (each circuit held its text was
unambiguous),172 the owners of famous marks and the
International Trademark Association have argued the legislative
history supports discarding pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards.173 In fact, during a hearing on the TDRA, thenPresident of the INTA, Anne Gundelfinger, testified that under the
TDRA, “[t]he less similar the marks, the less likely a consumer
association between the marks, the more similar the marks, or if
they are identical, the more likely it is that the junior mark will
impair the association of the senior mark with its source and/or its
particular brand attributes.”174 Consequently, it is argued that this
statement, in connection with other references to merely similar
marks qualifying for dilution protection, shows that the legislative
history supports eliminating pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards.175

168

See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 18–19, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-16322).
169
See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
171
See Brief of Appellant at 25, Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d 1158 (No. 09-16322).
172
See Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1172 n.10; Starbucks Corp v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee,
Inc. 588 F.3d 97, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2009).
173
Brief of Amicus Curiae International Trademark Association In Support of Vacatur
and Remand at 21–22, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d
1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-16322).
174
Id. at 22 (quoting Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President,
International Trademark Association)).
175
See id.
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2. The Case for Continuing to Employ Pre-TDRA Mark
Similarity Standards
Although district courts have upheld the continued use of preTDRA mark similarity standards in the dilution by blurring
analysis,176 the Second and Ninth Circuits are the only circuit
courts to address the continued applicability of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards.177 Additionally, some district courts that have
continued to apply pre-TDRA mark similarity standards did not
thoroughly analyze the issue.178 Regardless, the case for continued
use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards has developed through
the decisions of district courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board.179 Furthermore, small business and prominent trademark
scholars have argued for continued use of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards.180 In general, these arguments can be
organized into arguments based on the statutory text of the TDRA,
arguments based on the legislative history of the TDRA, arguments
based on generalizations of dilution as a theory of harm, and
arguments based on concern for the anti-competitive effects of
expansive dilution protection.
a) The Textual Argument for Continued Use of PreTDRA Mark Similarity Standards
The argument based on the statutory text focuses on the
TDRA’s definition of dilution by blurring as “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and the famous
mark . . . .”181 According to one district court, this language
176
See Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Schlussel, No. 1110061, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89199, at *16–17 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2011); V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 744–45 (W.D. Ky. 2008), aff’d 605
F.3d 382 (6th Cir 2010); Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Grp., No. CIV 030053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at *43 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007).
177
See 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(5)(c)(i).
178
See Schlussel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89199, at *16–17; V Secret Catalogue, 558 F.
Supp. 2d at 744–45. But see Century 21 Real Estate, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at
*43–44 (providing explicit discussion of the issue and its reasons for adhering to preTDRA mark similarity standards).
179
See infra Part II.A.2.a–d.
180
See infra Part II.A.2.a–d.
181
Century 21 Real Estate LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at *43 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)).
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indicates Congress’ intent to allow for the continued use of preTDRA mark similarity standards.182 In his prominent treatise,
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy expands on this argument.183
Professor McCarthy reasons that this language presupposes that a
mark must meet a given level of similarity before dilution can
occur.184 As a result, it is contended that the text of the blurring
definition supports continuing to employ pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards.
Although the statute also contains a list of relevant factors—
which includes “degree of similarity”—some parties still assert
that the text of the TDRA supports continuing to apply pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards. For example, since courts are charged
with interpreting a statute’s sections consistently, some argue that
courts must interpret “degree of similarity” and the list of relevant
factors in light of the dilution by blurring definition.185 It is
insisted that reading “degree of similarity” and the list of relevant
factors to prohibit pre-TDRA mark similarity standards violates
this principle of statutory interpretation.186 For these reasons,
small businesses and prominent trademark scholars argue that
proper interpretation of the TDRA allows for the continued use of
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
b) Arguments Relying on Legislative History to Show
Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Are Still
Appropriate
Although the legislative history is relatively sparse, small
business and prominent trademark scholars find support for their
position in the legislative history. For instance, despite the lengthy
discussion of the intended changes made by the TDRA, the
legislative history contains no discussion of an intention to alter the

182

See id.
4 THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24:117 (4th ed. 2011).
184
See id.
185
See, e.g., Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 19–20, Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-16322).
186
See id.
183
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mark similarity standards used by almost all circuits.187
Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that, during
consideration of the TDRA, a Republican congressman stated
federal dilution law “should be narrowly crafted . . . to protect only
the most famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the
distinctiveness of the mark.”188 This language arguably implies
that dilution protection is limited to uses of the famous mark, not
merely similar marks.189 Accordingly, because the legislative
history did not indicate whether congress intended to eliminate the
widespread use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, and
because the legislative history characterized dilution as applying to
identical marks, some insist that pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards are appropriately employed under the TDRA.190
c) Arguments that Dilution as a Theory of Harm Supports
Continuing to Apply Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity
Standards
Another argument is that dilution, as a theory of harm, requires
use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. For support, this
argument points to Schechter’s initial articulation of dilution.191 In
particular, since Schechter characterized dilution as the “gradual
whittling away . . . of the identity and hold upon the public mind of
the mark,” it is argued that dilution only applies to highly similar
or identical marks.192 Consistent with this proposition, Professor
McCarthy has similarly characterized dilution under federal law as
“one mark seen by customers as now identifying two sources.”193
According to Professor McCarthy, this concept of the harm caused
by dilution requires marks to be at least nearly identical.194

187

See id. at 28; see also Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Grp., No. CIV
03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9720, at *43 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2007) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 109-23 at 8, 25 (2005)).
188
Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 27, Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d 1158 (No. 0916322) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 25).
189
See id. at 28.
190
See id. at 29.
191
See id. at 30.
192
See id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 28, at 825).
193
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 183.
194
See id.
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Small businesses and prominent trademark scholars further
contend that federal courts have similarly characterized dilution in
this manner. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, characterized dilution
under the FTDA as a form of appropriation.195 And, according to
the Ninth Circuit, this meant the FTDA required use of identical or
nearly identical marks.196 Moreover, courts have described federal
dilution law as a limited remedy.197 For these reasons, some
contend that dilution as a theory of harm requires courts to employ
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
d) Arguments that Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards
Are Required to Prevent Federal Dilution Law from
Having Anti-Competitive Effects
The final category of argument supporting the continued use of
pre-TDRA mark similarity standard contends that these standards
are required to protect free and fair competition. Within this
category, the primary argument is that failing to use pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards would grant famous marks trademark
rights in gross. Professor McCarthy has aptly summarized this
argument by stating:
[N]o antidilution law should be so interpreted and
applied as to result in granting the owner of a
famous mark the automatic right to exclude any and
all uses of similar marks in all product or service
lines. Such a radical expansion of trademark
exclusionary rights would upset the delicate balance
between free competition and fair competition.
Rejection of such an expansion is consistent with
the fundamental principles and purposes of
trademark protection. The balance between fair
competition and free competition must always be
maintained and kept fine-tuned for the economy to

195

Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id.
197
See, e.g., AutoZone v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 805–06 (citing Jet, Inc. v.
Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 1999)).
196

C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 4:49 PM

EVOLUTION OR MUTATION?

321

work at a reasonable rate of efficiency and
competitiveness.198
This concern has been embraced by courts that recognize “the
implications of a broad application of the federal antidilution
statute are troubling, as dilution causes of action, much more so
than infringement and unfair competition laws, tread very close to
granting rights in gross in a trademark.”199 A recent student Note
provides concrete examples of the consequences of failing to use
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.200 Specifically, the Note
asserts that without pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, “Federal
Express” becomes a prohibition against the use of “Federal Press,”
“Federal Impress” and “Federal Empress,” along with many other
variations of “Federal Express.”201
Another student Note has recently provided a different concern
regarding the anti-competitive effects of failing to employ preTDRA mark similarity standards.202 In particular, the Note
focused on the special problem posed by dilution protection of
marks used on products in competition.203 For instance, consider a
creative industry where marks serve more than just a source
designation purpose, like the fashion industry. Creative industries
such as this are built on a culture of borrowing.204 In these
industries, the Note argues, expansive dilution protection will have
tremendous anti-competitive effects.205 The Note enumerates that

198

4 MCCARTHY, supra note 183, § 24:67 (4th ed. 2011); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. b (1995) (noting that “courts continue to
confine the cause of action for dilution to cases in which the protectable interest is clear
and the threat of interference is substantial”).
199
Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
200
Chris Brown, Note, A Dilution Delusion: The Unjustifiable Protection of Similar
Marks, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1039–40 (2004).
201
See id.
202
See Brandy G. Barrett, Recent Development, Contrasting Levi v. Abercrombie with
Louboutin v. Yves St. Laurent: Revealing Appropriate Trademark Boundaries in the
Fashion World, 13 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 20–21 (2011), available at
http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/files/Barrett_1_34.pdf.
203
See id.
204
See id.
205
See id.
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dilution protection of dissimilar or minimally similar marks would
grant companies with household names monopolies on the creative
output of the industry and, therefore, would allow them to halt the
progress of the industry.206 Accordingly, it is argued that courts
should continue to employ pre-TDRA mark similarity standards
because of the potential anti-competitive effects.
B. Evolutionary Uncertainty: Examining the Inconsistent
Treatment of Mark Similarity in the Absence of Pre-TDRA
Mark Similarity Standards
Even though many courts agree pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards should be discarded, these courts treat mark similarity
different in the absence of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
The Second and Ninth Circuits have employed similar, yet
different approaches minimizing the role of mark similarity under
the TDRA and refusing to employ any mark similarity standard. In
contrast, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s approach
employs a relaxed mark similarity standard. This section details
the approaches of these courts in turn.
1. The Similar Approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuit
The Second and Ninth Circuits have employed similar
treatments of mark similarity since discarding their pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards. However, there are small differences.
The Second circuit minimized the importance of mark similarity
and refused to employ a mark similarity standard. The Ninth
Circuit differs from this approach slightly because it recognizes
mark similarity as a special, possibly necessary, but not dispositive
factor. Nevertheless, the Second and Ninth Circuit treat mark
similarity in much the same way.
a) The Second Circuit
As discussed above, in Starbucks, the Second Circuit held its
pre-TDRA mark similarity standard should no longer be
employed.207 Instead, the court noted “the existence of some—but

206
207

See id.
See supra Part II.A.1.a.

C05_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/5/2013 4:49 PM

EVOLUTION OR MUTATION?

323

not substantial—similarity between the marks may be sufficient in
some cases to demonstrate a likelihood of dilution by blurring.”208
Then, the court recognized “similarity is an integral element in the
definition of blurring.”209 However, the court instructed “degree of
similarity” should be weighed without reference to a mark
similarity standard and should not be treated differently than the
other relevant factors listed in the TDRA.210 According to the
court, the proper approach to determining whether dilution by
blurring exists is to equally weigh “degree of similarity” with the
remaining factors, focusing on “whether an association, arising
from the similarity between the subject marks, ‘impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.’”211
On remand, the district court’s application of the Second
Circuit’s methodology may give insight into its future impact.
After discussing the relevant factors, the district court stated mark
similarity factor was an “obviously important factor[].”212 In
reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the presence of
similarity in the dilution by blurring definition.213 Furthermore,
the “ultimate” question, according to the district court, was
“whether there is an association, arising from the similarity of the
relevant marks, that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous
mark.”214
However, before answering this question, the district court
indicated it would be “mindful of the purposes and core principles

208

Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 107 n.3, 108 (2d Cir.
2009).
209
Id. at 108.
210
See id. (“[W]ere we to adhere to a substantial similarity requirement for all dilution
by blurring claims, the significance of the remaining five factors would be materially
diminished.”); see also Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 U.P.S.Q.2d
(BNA) 1645, 1667 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (interpreting Starbucks as requiring all factors to be treated equally).
211
Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 109 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)).
212
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212,
1215–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
213
Id. at 1217. The district court also found the actual association factor was an
“obviously important factor” because the dilution by blurring definition indicates an
association is required. Id.
214
Id. at 1216. (citing Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109).
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of trademark law.”215 In particular, the district court focused on
the idea that trademark law does not create a right in gross.216
Then, focusing on inadequacies in the mark similarity and
association factors, the court determined a likelihood of dilution by
blurring was not present.217
On its face, the district court’s analysis seems at odds with the
Second Circuit’s proposed analysis. Specifically, the district court
seemed to indicate mark similarity was more important than other
factors.218 In addition, the district court added to the Second
Circuit’s proposed analysis by referring to trademark policies,
which it indicated, justified carefully analyzing a claim of dilution
by blurring.219 The district court’s decision creates uncertainty in
the Second Circuit regarding the appropriate role of similarity in
relation to the other factors.
b) The Ninth Circuit
As discussed above, in Levi Strauss & Co., the Ninth Circuit
held its pre-TDRA mark similarity standard was not applicable to
the TDRA.220 Then, turning to the role of mark similarity, the
court stated: “similarity has a special role to play in the
implementation of the [TDRA’s] multifactor approach.”221 The
court reached this result because similarity is singled out in the
dilution by blurring definition and is “the first factor listed in the
multifactor approach.”222 However, the court continued by
recognizing that similarity should not “be the necessarily
controlling factor.” The court instructed the relevant factors
should be considered to determine whether dilution by blurring is
likely.223

215

Id.
Id.
217
Id. at 1217.
218
See id.
219
See id.
220
See supra Part II.A.1.b.
221
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2011).
222
Id. at 1171–72.
223
See id. at 1173 (“[W]e took the degree of similarity into account with the other . . .
factors in determining whether dilution [by blurring] was likely to occur.”).
216
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Regardless, the court also found the factors “are not necessarily
entitled to the same weight.”224 In particular, “[a] sufficiently
strong showing of similarity can overcome all other relevant
factors.”225 This language indicates the Ninth Circuit will allow a
wealth of mark similarity to be dispositive.226 The Ninth Circuit
also asserted, “[a]lthough we hold that a particular degree of
similarity is not a threshold, similarity is a necessary predicate for
the dilution by blurring analysis.”227 While this language has not
been subsequently interpreted, it seems to show the Ninth Circuit
will not allow a lack of similarity to be dispositive.228
2. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Vastly Different
Approach
Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board initially held
its pre-TDRA mark similarity standards survived the passage of
the TDRA,229 the Board later joined the Second and Ninth Circuits
in holding pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were no longer
applicable.230 Unlike the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Board
employs a vastly different approach concerning the proper role of
mark similarity in the blurring analysis. In particular, the Board
judges mark similarity by a standard that requires less similarity
than pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.231 The Board’s mark
similarity standard asks “whether the two involved marks are
sufficiently similar to trigger consumers to conjure up a famous
mark when confronted with the second mark.”232
The Board further detailed different enunciations of the
standard. Explaining the standard, the Board has indicated the

224

Id. at 1173 n.11.
Id. (citing Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010)).
226
See id. at 1173 n.11.
227
Id. at 1173 n.12.
228
See id.
229
See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645,
1666–67 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
230
See Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1028–30 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
231
See id. at 1129; Research in Motion Ltd. v. Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc.,
2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *35 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2012).
232
Research in Motion, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *35.
225
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marks do not need to be “substantially identical.”233 Rather, “it is
sufficient that the [marks] be highly similar.”234 The Board has
also enunciated the standard in different ways. For instance, the
Board has asked whether “a substantial percentage of consumers”
are “immediately reminded of the famous mark” by the junior
mark and associate the two marks.235 The Board’s explanation of
the standard and its alternate formulations of the standard give
insight into the meaning of its new, lower mark similarity standard.
Another source of insight into the standard’s meaning is its
application. The Board has applied its new mark similarity
standard to several pairs of marks. Specifically, the Board found
“Crackberry” and “Blackberry,”236 “Motown” and “Motown
Metal,”237 “Just Do It” and “Just Jesu It,”238 and “The Other White
Meat” and “The Other Red Meat”239 met the standard. Conversely,
the Board found the marks “Rolex” and “Roll-X” did not meet the
standard.240 Although application of the standard provides insight
into its meaning, it is difficult to distinguish between the marks
that did and the marks that did not meet the standard.
It is also unclear whether the Board’s mark similarity standard
is a threshold requirement in the dilution analysis. The Board has
repeatedly described its standard as a prerequisite to a finding of
likelihood of dilution by blurring.241 The Board also previously
indicated lack of similarity could be potentially dispositive.242
233

Id.
Id.
235
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1868, 1888 (T.T.A.B.
2011); see also Nike, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028–30.
236
Research in Motion, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *36.
237
UMG Recordings, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
238
Nike, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028–30.
239
Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479,
1497 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
240
Rolex Watch U.S.A. Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188,
1194–95 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
241
See, e.g., Research in Motion, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 45, at *35 (discussing “sufficient
similarity” standard requires marks to be highly similar).
242
See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc. 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645, 1667
(T.T.A.B. 2010) aff’d on other grounds, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011). To reach this
conclusion, the Board applied the Federal Circuit’s reasoning that, in the likelihood of
confusion analysis from traditional trademark infringement, “in a particular case even a
single [likelihood of confusion] factor may be dispositive.” Id. Consequently, the Board
234
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Conversely, in the only case where the standard was not satisfied,
the Board continued to analyze the remaining factors and, instead
of relying only on the lack of similarity, determined that, on the
balance, the factors justified finding there was no likelihood of
dilution by blurring.243 Accordingly, while it appears the Board
treats similarity as a potentially dispositive factor, the precise role
of similarity—whether as a threshold element or especially
important factor—is unclear.
III. THE PROPER EVOLUTIONARY COURSE: WHY PRE-TDRA MARK
SIMILARITY STANDARDS SHOULD BE DISCARDED AND THE
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD’S APPROACH TO
ANALYZING MARK SIMILARITY SHOULD BE ADOPTED
We here analyze the conflict regarding whether pre-TDRA
mark similarity should continue to be used under the TDRA and, if
not, what the proper role of mark similarity is in their absence. We
begin by demonstrating why pre-TDRA mark similarity standards
are no longer employable under the TDRA. We then show why
courts should adopt the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s
approach to mark similarity in their stead.
A. Why Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Should Be
Discarded
The Second and Ninth Circuits correctly determined that the
text of the TDRA unambiguously compelled elimination of preTDRA mark similarity standards. And even if the TDRA does not
unambiguously compel elimination of pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards, the text of the TDRA does not support the continued use
of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
Pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards should not be read into the TDRA because
these standards were improperly justified at their adoption and
extrinsic evidence is, at best, conflicting and problematic. Instead,
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, which were hostile

rejected the Second Circuit’s requirement that each factor be given the same weight in the
dilution by blurring analysis. See id.
243
Rolex Watch, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1195–97.
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interpretations of the prior law, should be left behind as dilution
continues to evolve.
1. The Plain Language of the TDRA Does Not Support PreTDRA Mark Similarity Standards
The Second and Ninth Circuit correctly determined the text of
the TDRA prohibits the continued application of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards. In fact, the text of the TDRA only refers to
“similarity” and “degree of similarity.”244 Notably absent is any
reference to “substantial similarity” or “identity.”245 Furthermore,
although Professors Thomas J. McCarthy and Anne Gilson
LaLonde have urged courts to continue employing pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards, these same scholars admit that the text
of the TDRA does not require use of pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards.246 Accordingly, there is no mention of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards in the TDRA and, as a result, the plain
language of the TDRA does not allow for their continued use.
Even if the text of the TDRA does not unambiguously require
courts to cease using pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, preTDRA mark similarity standards are not justifiable by the text of
the TDRA. Instead, the TDRA is completely silent regarding the
continued use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.247 Whether
a court determines that the plain language of the TDRA requires
abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards or the TDRA is
merely silent on the matter, the text of the TDRA does not support
the use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
2. Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Should not Continue
to Be Employed Because They Were Improperly Justified
when Adopted Under the FTDA
When initially adopted, pre-TDRA mark similarity standards
were either unjustified extensions of state law or erroneously
justified interpretations of federal law. In many circuits, preTDRA mark similarity standards were not justified by reference to
244
245
246
247

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
See id.
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 183; 2-5A LALONDE, supra note 27, § 5A.01(5)(c)(i).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
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the statutory language.248 In these circuits, pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards can be traced to a single decision of the
Second Circuit interpreting New York’s dissimilar dilution
statute.249
Accordingly, in those circuits, pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards were unjustified extensions of state law.
In other circuits, pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were
erroneously justified by reference to the text of the FTDA. Most
notably, the Ninth Circuit erroneously interpreted the following
language to justify its pre-TDRA mark similarity standards: “The
owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”250 The
Ninth Circuit determined placement of the definite article proved
use of an identical mark was required.251
However, the language does not lend itself to this
interpretation. Instead, the definite article signifies that the mark
that has become famous must be the plaintiff’s mark and not some
other mark. This reading is bolstered by the changes made by
Congress in the TDRA. In particular, the TDRA now reads:
“[T]he owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an
injunction against another person who, at any time after the
owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or
trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution.”252 The
emphasized language makes clear that the definite article is not
used in conjunction with the junior mark. Furthermore, this
language has been correctly interpreted not to require the junior
mark to be identical to the famous mark.253 Consequently, even in
cases purporting to justify pre-TDRA mark similarity standards by
the text of the TDRA, the standards were improperly justified.
Courts should not read erroneously pre-TDRA mark similarity

248
249
250
251
252
253

See supra notes 79, 129–32, 159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129–32, 159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–164.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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standards into the TDRA and, as a result, pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards should no longer be employed.
3. Extrinsic Evidence Supports Interpreting the Text of the
TDRA to Prohibit Use of Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity
Standards
Extrinsic evidence supports the elimination of pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards from the blurring analysis. For one, since
many different pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were
employed under the prior law, continuing to employ these
standards defeats Congress’s intent to provide uniformity in the
application of federal dilution law. Additionally, legislative
history supports abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.
The legislative history is also sparse, problematic, and conflicted.
At a minimum, it should not be used to read pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards into the TDRA. Likewise, dilution as a theory
of harm does not overcome the text of the TDRA because dilution
is not reducible to a single theory and is still being defined.
Alleged anti-competitive effects also do not overcome the text of
the TDRA because they are unproven and improperly focus on
hamstringing dilution through similarity when the TDRA is
already crafted to limit the anti-competitive effects. In the end, the
text of the TDRA must be allowed to control because extrinsic
evidence supports abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards and, regardless, potentially contradictory evidence is
overstated and problematic.
a) Congress’s Intent to Remedy Inconsistent
Interpretations of the Prior Federal Law Compels
Elimination of Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards
Allowing pre-TDRA mark similarity standards to be employed
defeats Congress’s intent to remove inconsistent and hostile
interpretations from federal dilution law. Congress enacted the
TDRA to remedy courts’ inconsistent and hostile interpretations of
the prior federal statute.254 Under the prior federal law, many
circuits applied their own widely different mark similarity

254

See H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 3 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1092.
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standards.255 Congress did not expressly incorporate a pre-TDRA
mark similarity standard.256 Consequently, reading pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards into the TDRA would defeat Congress’s
intent to remove the inconsistent and hostile interpretations that
plagued the prior federal law.
b) The Legislative History Supports Eliminating PreTDRA Mark Similarity Standards
The legislative history contains explicit support for abandoning
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. For instance, in discussing
dilution by blurring and mark similarity, the legislative history
contains the following language: “The less similar the marks, the
less likely a consumer association between the marks; the more
similar the marks, or if they are identical, the more likely it is that
the junior mark will impair the association of the senior mark with
its source and/or its particular brand attributes.”257 This language
clearly supports eliminating pre-TDRA mark similarity standards
because it indicates that while high mark similarity makes blurring
more likely, it is not necessary.258 Accordingly, pre-TDRA mark
similarity standards are inconsistent with legislative history and, as
a result, should not be read into the text of the TDRA.
Regardless, small businesses and trademark scholars rely on
legislative history to overcome the text of the TDRA.259 However,
ignoring the legislative history’s explicit support for eliminating
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards, the legislative history is
sparse and problematic. Notably, the legislative history does not
mention mark similarity standards.260 Accordingly, the legislative
history is not particularly helpful. And to resort to legislative
history that “do[es] not squarely address the question presented” is
255

See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
257
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, then-President,
International Trademark Association).
258
See supra notes 174–75and accompanying text.
259
Supra Part II.A.2.b.
260
See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1172
n.10 (9th Cir. 2011).
256
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“particularly inappropriate.”261 Accordingly, the text of the TDRA
should control, and pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should
not be inserted into the TDRA.
In response, small businesses and trademark scholars point to
comments in the legislative history indicating dilution “should be
narrowly crafted . . . to protect only the most famous trademark
from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or
tarnish or disparage it.”262 They argue that the “subsequent uses”
language shows Congress intended pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards to be part of the TDRA.263 However, this is an
inappropriate interpretation because drawing the preceding
inference from this language requires the assumption that the
speaker was conveying information about mark similarity
standards. For this reason, it is important to recognize that
clarifying and limiting which marks were famous enough to
receive dilution protection was an important part of the TDRA.264
In fact, after this comment the legislative history discussed the
changes made through the TDRA including those with respect to
fame.265 Accordingly, the comment’s emphasis on limiting fame
by stating “only the most famous marks” deserve protection and
the TDRA’s focus on limiting fame cast doubt on the proponents
interpretation. As a result, comments like this in the legislative
history should not be read to support the continued use of preTDRA mark similarity standards.
Small businesses and trademark scholars ultimately rely on the
legislative history’s silence to prove the TDRA was not intended to
bar use of pre-TDRA mark similarity standards.266 However, “not
every silence is pregnant.”267 And silence is not sufficient to
overcome the text of the TDRA and the extrinsic evidence’s
261

Id. (quoting Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)).
E.g., Response Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 27, Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
109-23, at 25 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1093) (internal quotation
marks and emphasis omitted).
263
See id.
264
See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 5 (2005) reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1094.
265
See id. at 25.
266
See supra Part II.A.2.a.
267
State of Ill., Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1983).
262
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support for abandoning pre-TDRA mark similarity standards. For
these reasons, the text of the TDRA, which supports abandoning
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards,268 must be allowed to
control.
c) Dilution Theory Does not Require Use of Pre-TDRA
Mark Similarity Standards Because Dilution Has
Evolved into Multiple Species
Pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should be abandoned
because arguments that dilution theory requires the use of preTDRA mark similarity standards in the blurring analysis are
flawed and overstated. These arguments are flawed because they
fail to take into account that dilution exists in several different
forms and, as a result, generalizations about dilution are not
persuasive. For instance, state dilution law does not require a mark
to be famous before dilution protection is granted.269 Additionally,
Schechter’s initial articulation of dilution focused on protecting
unique marks that added to the language.270 In contrast, federal
dilution law requires a high level of fame and does not limit
protection to unique marks.271 Interpretation of federal dilution
law is impacted only by Congress’s conception of dilution as
evidenced by the statutory language and legislative history.
Arguments that dilution theory requires the use of pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards are also overstated for two reasons.
First, the case law defining dilution theory was crafted over a
period of time where courts were hostile to dilution and interpreted
federal dilution law in ways to limit the new cause of action.272
Second, courts and commentators have entertained a variety of
theories to justify dilution protection.273 For these reasons,
arguments about what dilution theory requires should not be given
268

See supra Part III.A.1.
2-5A LALONDE, supra 27, § 5A.02(1) (2011).
270
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
271
See supra Part I.C.
272
See supra Part I.B.
273
See generally Alexander Dworkowitz, Ending Dilution Doublespeak: Reviving the
Concept of Economic Harm in the Dilution Action, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25, 31–42
(2011) (discussing the different theories of dilution courts and commentators have relied
on).
269
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much weight. Instead, the language of the TDRA should be the
vehicle for defining Congress’s intended definition of dilution
theory and pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should no longer
be employed.
d) Pre-TDRA Mark Similarity Standards Are not
Necessary to Protect Against Unproven AntiCompetitive Effects
Arguments that the anti-competitive effects of failing to
employ pre-TDRA mark similarity standards require their use
improperly focus on pre-TDRA mark similarity standards as the
proper solution to an unproven problem. On the one hand,
although commentators may be correct that eliminating pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards may turn “Federal Express” into a
prohibition against use of similar marks, they fail to show any
harm caused by this result.274 All that would occur is that a new
business would have to pick a different name, of which the
possibilities are limitless. Accordingly, the protection of famous
marks against potentially harmful uses should not be curtailed by
an unproven and harmless concern.
Additionally, these arguments improperly focus on similarity
as the proper solution. For instance, in creative industries where
the marks are in direct competition, it is argued that abandoning
pre-TDRA mark similarity standards will allow for stifling of
creativity because famous marks will own the creative work
product of the industry.275 However, the TDRA already limits the
extent of dilution protection in these areas by recognizing the
extent of exclusive use of the mark as part of the blurring
analysis.276 Accordingly, dilution by blurring analysis already
provides a method for dealing with this concern and, therefore, this
concern does not require use of pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards.
Concern that dilution protection in the absence of pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards will run afoul of the general presumption

274
275
276

See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006).
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against trademark rights in gross are similarly misplaced. To
enumerate, the general presumption against trademark rights
precludes protection in instances where the right to protection does
not grow out of the use of the mark.277 Under the TDRA, dilution
by blurring protects those famous marks that have so pervaded the
marketplace that they transcend traditional commercial boundaries,
having become household names.278 Accordingly, this protection
does grow out of use of the mark and is not simply a property
right. Furthermore, even if this were not the case, Congress clearly
has the power to make laws allowing for trademark rights in gross
to be granted.279 Consequently, the general presumption against
trademark rights in gross should not be used to cripple a valid act
of Congress.
B. Why Courts Should Use the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board’s Approach to Mark Similarity
As demonstrated in Part III.A, pre-TDRA mark similarity
standards are no longer appropriately employed in the dilution by
blurring analysis. However, this does not answer the question of
what role mark similarity should have under the TDRA. Here I
argue that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s standard
should be used to judge mark similarity because it is closely
tailored to the text of the TDRA. Although the Board is unclear as
to the dispositive nature of its mark similarity standard, we show
why its mark similarity standard should be regarded as a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for a finding of likely dilution by
blurring. I also explain the Board’s mark similarity standard
should be used because, for practical reasons, it is necessary and
appropriate.
1. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Treatment of
Mark Similarity Is Justified by the Plain Language of the
TDRA
The Board’s mark similarity standard is appropriately
employed under the TDRA because the plain language of the
277
278
279

See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
See United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918).
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TDRA requires its use. Parsing the language of the TDRA leads to
a two-step analysis for determining whether a likelihood of
dilution by blurring exists.280 First, there must be an “association
arising from the similarity.”281 Second, this “association” must
“impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”282 The Board’s
mark similarity standard, which asks, “whether the two involved
marks are sufficiently similar to trigger consumers to conjure up a
famous mark when confronted with the second mark,”283 closely
parallels the first step of the two-step analysis. Accordingly, the
plain language of the TDRA requires the Board’s mark similarity
standard.
The list of relevant factors and the “degree of similarity”
standard do not overcome this interpretation of the dilution by
blurring definition. Statutory provisions are interpreted so as not
to contradict or render meaningless other provisions.284 This
principle is strengthened in this case because the relevant factors,
including “degree of similarity,” are intended to aid courts in
applying the dilution by blurring definition. For these two reasons,
the relevant factors, including “degree of similarity,” should not be
interpreted to contradict the blurring definition. Instead, “degree
of similarity” should be interpreted to indicate that once the
standard shows that the requisite association exists, the “degree of
similarity” will impact the analysis of whether the association
“impairs the distinctiveness” of the famous mark.
This
interpretation is consistent with the dictionary definition of
“degree” as a “measure”—and it does not preclude a floor or

280

Cf. Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir.
2012) (ìTo state a dilution claim under the TDRA, [a plaintiff] must show . . . (iii) that the
similarity [between the marks] gives rise to an association between the marks; and (iv)
that the association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the [famous mark] . . . .î)
(citing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264–65
(4th Cir. 2007)).
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479,
1497 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
284
See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (“Our
cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render
superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.”).
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ceiling on those values.285 Consequently, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board’s standard is justified by the text of the TDRA.
2. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s Mark Similarity
Standard Should Be Treated as a Necessary, but Not
Sufficient Condition
Analyzing the plain language of the TDRA shows the new,
lower mark similarity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for a finding of likely dilution by blurring. To demonstrate,
although “association arising from the similarity” is clearly a prerequisite for a finding of dilution by blurring, the ultimate question
is whether this association “impair[s] the distinctiveness of the
famous mark.”286 Consequently, failing to meet the Board’s mark
similarity standard means no likelihood of dilution can exist. On
the other hand, meeting the Board’s mark similarity standard
should not be regarded as dispositive because the association must
also “impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”287 Therefore,
according to the plain language of the TDRA, the new mark
similarity standard is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a
finding of likely dilution by blurring.
Interpreting the TDRA to allow similarity to be dispositive is
supported because similarity is allowed to be dispositive in
traditional infringement actions where similarity does not have the
same importance. In the likelihood of confusion context, similarity
can be dispositive depending on the facts of the case.288 Although
likelihood of dilution and likelihood of confusion are not the same,
many courts’ dilution analyses are informed by their vast
experience with confusion.289 Allowing similarity to be treated in
this manner is more appropriate in the blurring context because of
its stronger emphasis in the definition on blurring.290 Accordingly,
the treatment of similarity in the likelihood of confusion context

285
286
287
288
289
290

THE MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 304 (10th ed. 1997).
See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
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supports treating the new mark similarity standard as a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition in the blurring analysis.
3. Practical Considerations Support Employing the New Mark
Similarity Standard
The Board’s new mark similarity standard should be employed
because practical considerations make it a necessary and
appropriate element of the blurring analysis. Chiefly, requiring
courts to use the mark similarity standard focuses the court’s
analysis of similarity on what is required by the blurring definition.
In contrast, failing to employ the mark similarity standard means
courts will analyze similarity in a vacuum. This consideration is
important because it is more likely that courts will use mark
similarity appropriately when they are guided in their analysis.
Additionally, the Board’s mark similarity standard is
appropriate because there is little risk that employing the standard
will keep valid claims from being heard by a court. To explain, the
mark similarity standard focuses on consumer association, a prerequisite to likely dilution by blurring. The standard does not ask
the ultimate question of whether this association is significant
enough to “impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”
Rather, the standard is a significantly lower burden than the
ultimate determination. As a result, from a practical perspective,
employing the Board’s new mark similarity standard is appropriate
because there is little downside.
On the other hand, employing the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board’s mark similarity standard protects, in a minimally
restrictive way, against the anti-competitive effects of excessive
dilution by blurring litigation. For instance, if the owner of a
famous mark brings a dilution by blurring claim against a small
business, the standard provides the other company with the ability
to quickly defeat frivolous dilution by blurring claims without
bearing the expense of a whole trial. This standard also allows
frivolous claims of dilution by blurring to be dismissed on
inexpensive grounds because comparing similarity requires little
expense. But, addressing all of the relevant factors, which includes
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survey evidence, would be very expensive.291 Accordingly, using
the Board’s mark similarity standard prevents dilution by blurring
claims from being used as anti-competitive weapons without
restricting valid claims.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the TDRA in response to hostile judicial
interpretation of pre-TDRA federal dilution law. The TDRA
should not be interpreted to include improperly justified pre-TDRA
mark similarity standards without an express indication of
Congress’s desire to adopt them. The TDRA is silent on the issue
of whether these pre-TDRA mark similarity standards were
adopted and extrinsic evidence of Congress’s intent is unclear at
best. Therefore, pre-TDRA mark similarity standards should not
be read into the TDRA. Instead, the TDRA should be interpreted
based on the language therein to allow for the use of the new,
lower mark similarity standards employed by the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board. This standard, which closely tracks the
language of the TDRA, is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for a finding of likelihood of dilution by blurring. Deciding
otherwise will stunt the evolution of federal dilution law by
abandoning the text of the TDRA in favor of previous hostile
interpretations.

291

See, e.g., David M. Kelly, Comment, Trademarks: Protection of Merchandising
Properties in Professional Sports, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 927, 961 (1984) (noting that survey
evidence is very expensive and that in the 1980s one survey cost in excess of one-half
million dollars).
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APPENDIX

Figure A – Levi Strauss & Co.’s Arcuate Mark

Figure B – Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.’s “Ruehl” mark

